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Abstract
The existing potential of mobile devices attract government to use mobile devices at the government level. Therefore, the
ISO 18013-5 [1] standard for identity identification was developed. It provides a mechanism for obtaining and trusting
driver’s license data. This paper describes an approach to deploy mobile driver’s license system and an approach to
enhance security for data storage based on analysis of existing methods and models.
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1. Introduction
Today, virtualization of everything becomes more
relevant, more and more ordinary processes are moving
to the digital world. Taking into account, that majority
of people have smartphones it allows to deploy mobile
driver license system on state level, which can be a bene-
fit to both of sides users and government [2]. Therefore,
it is suggested to transfer physical documents to the
digital world. In this case, it is purposed to use the
smartphone as a carrier of sensitive user information
(in particular driver’s license). On the one hand, it
facilitates the life of the user, there is no need to carry
documents that can be lost, on the other hand it makes
process of identity verification much easier and far reli-
able, since this system will guarantee the authenticity
of the data and will not cause distrust on either side.
Currently exists a technology, but appears a prob-
lem of the deployment of such system into the real
environment based on the government and device’s
manufacturers limitations.
2. Background
In this section, presented a brief overview of technolo-
gies which will figure in this work.
2.1. Trusted Execution Environment
The TEE concept is based on a virtualization abstrac-
tion of device hardware and resources to host and exe-
cute security-sensitive applications and store sensitive
data on a mobile platform. In its turn Rich Execution
Environment (for example Android OS) can not provide
a required security level for processing sensitive data
and it is vulnerable to a large number of attacks. TEE
provides a mobile phone processor (CPU) extension
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that enables it to operate normally or in secure mode
or in high security mode. Typically, it separates to two
modes: normal world (NWd) and secure world (SWd).
TEE provides only secondary protection compared to
embedded Secure Element (eSE) [3]. TEE’s goal is to
isolate sensitive resources hardware and software (for
example CPU, memory, GPU, storage, data) so that
only authorized applications, known as trusted applica-
tions (TA), are accessed and executed in a highly secure
context. The TEE security kernel is implemented by
a secure kernel that manages the separation of critical
processes, security domains, and secure access to device
resources and any associated drivers [3].
2.2. Trusted application
TA is executed in the context of TEE and protected
by software and cryptographic isolation. Such an appli-
cation is usually a small binary code that implements
the TEE APIs. They are cryptographically signed,
securely loaded and responsible for security-sensitive
transactions. TA is also known as the Trustlet. Any
TA communicates with other applications such as RA
through the TEE Client API, which provides a connec-
tor interface between the secure kernel and Rich OS.
TA also gained access to secure storage in TEE. TA
facilitates the creation of a secure channel with other
trusted entities, such as eSE, for the purpose of sharing
sensitive security data. It plays a key role in the reli-
able collection of user credentials and the execution of
security sensitive operations [3].
2.3. Normal World
Normal world - runs the standard software stack that
the user expects to see: Linux, Android or the like [4].
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The ARM TrustZone concept is based on the division
of the runtime environment into secure and unsecured
ones. Moreover, Normal World (NWd) does not have
access to Secure World (SWd), whereas the latter can
be accessed anywhere. This approach affects not only
the processor, but also memory, bus transactions, inter-
rupts, peripherals within System-on-a-Chip (SoC) and,
including, software.
2.4. Secure World
Secure world - runs a separate and typically unseen
operating system that provides security services to appli-
cations running in the NWd and to the NWd operating
system itself. SWd stack is very compact and contains
only minimum code necessary to service the security
functions of the NWd software [4].
2.5. Java Card
JavaCard is a type of SmartCard. A smart card
is a portable and tamper-resistant computer. Unlike
magnetic stripe cards, smart cards carry both processing
power and information. Therefore, they do not require
access to remote databases at the time of a transaction
[5].
Java Card technology offers a way to overcome obsta-
cles hindering smart card acceptance. It allows smart
cards and other memory-constrained devices to run
applications (called applets) written in the Java pro-
gramming language. Essentially, Java Card technology
defines a secure, portable, and multiapplication smart
card platform that incorporates many main advantages
of the Java language [5].
2.6. Java Card Applets
Java Card applets should not be confused with Java
applets because of identical name - applets. A Java
Card applet is a Java program that adheres to a set
of conventions that allow it to run within the Java
Card runtime environment. A Java Card applet is not
intended to run within a browser environment. The
reason the name applet was chosen for Java Card appli-
cations is that Java Card applets can be loaded into the
Java Card runtime environment after the card has been
manufactured. That is, unlike applications in many
embedded systems, applets do not need to be burned
into the ROM during manufacture. Rather, they can
be dynamically downloaded onto the card at a later
time [5].
2.7. Secure Element
A Secure Element is a tamper-resistant platform (typ-
ically a one chip secure microcontroller) capable of se-
curely hosting applications and their confidential and
cryptographic data (for example cryptographic keys)
in accordance with the rules and security requirements
set by well-identified trusted authorities. There are
different form factors of SE: embedded and integrated
SEs, SIM/UICC, smart microSD as well as smart cards.
SEs exist in different form factors to address the re-
quirements of different business implementations and
market needs [6].
Fig. 1. Mobile device architecture
3. Related Work
There are several possible options for implementing
mobile driver’s license system (mDL), all of which have
common features since they are based on ISO 18013-5
[1] specification, the main differences in these imple-
mentations is how to store sensitive data on a user’s
device and how to authenticate this data [7]. Precisely
on the analysis of variants of sensitive data storage will
be purposed a new security enhanced approach to store
sensitive data on user device and secure representation
on reader device as well. Such variants of data storage
and processing:
1) Rich Execution Environment
2) Rich Execution Environment + embedded Secure
Element
3) Rich Execution Environment + Trusted Execution
Environment
4) Rich Execution Environment + Trusted Execution
Environment + embedded Secure Element
All the variants of the proposed system are intended
to be used on the Android platform devices as it is the
most common operating system for mobile devices.The
mobile driver’s license system must include the reader
side - the application for reading and verifying data;
the holder side - the application containing sensitive
user data (driver’s license information) [7].
3.1. Rich Execution Environment
User credentials are stored directly in Rich Execution
Environment (REE), that means within the operating
system of the mobile device itself. For example, in the
package of the application itself, in another application,
or as a file in the device storage. In such case, all
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cryptographic operations are performed in the REE,
which is not completely secure. Compromising device
OS can lead to leakage of the user sensitive data or
could be vulnerable to replication attacks if device has
root access. On the other hand, verification on the
reader is also executing in the REE which can also lead
to data leakage. The advantages of this approach are
that the system can be implemented on any mobile
device with the Android operating system [8].
3.2. Rich Execution Environment + em-
bedded Secure Element
User credentials are stored in the embedded Secure
Element (eSE) and all cryptographic calculations are
also performed in the eSE. The eSE is a separate pro-
cessor with its own OS which is isolated from the REE.
The eSE that installed in mobile devices are EAL4+ [9]
or higher certified [10], which permits to gain maximum
assurance from security engineering. This allows to re-
sist most attacks, including physical attacks. However,
verification of user data is executed in REE, which can
cause confidential data leak [8].
This approach is more secure but imposes restrictions
on the deployment. Therefore, such a system can only
be deployed on devices that have an eSE. Also there is
an issue with provisioning of user’s data, because access
to the eSE only possible with special keys from chip
vendor.
3.3. Rich Execution Environment +
Trusted Execution Environment
User credentials are stored in Trusted application in
TEE and all cryptographic calculations are also per-
formed in TEE. TEE is a special area of the main
processor that allows to isolate command execution
from REE, it also guarantees confidentiality and in-
tegrity. TEE offers higher data security than REE and
more functionality than eSE. Thus, the use of TEE is
a fairly safe use but does not protect against physical
attacks [8].
This approach also imposes its limitations, because
such a system can only be deployed on devices that
support TEE, but at the moment, almost all modern
processors support TEE. The same issue are exist for
using TEE as for using eSE, trusted application must
be signed by vendor.
3.4. Rich Execution Environment +
Trusted Execution Environment +
embedded Secure Element
User credentials are stored in the eSE, but all cryp-
tographic calculations are performed in the TEE. This
approach the most secure of all represented [8].
4. Statement of the problem
This paper discusses the advantages and disadvan-
tages of using different approaches to store sensitive
user data on mobile devices, verifying it and deploy-
ment mobile driver’s license system as a whole. Based
on analysis of this approach a new security enhanced
system will be purposed. As it is about system that
intended to use confidential data on state level, the se-
curity of the system is more important than simplicity
of it realization [7].
The object of study is the personal identification via
mobile devices.
The subject of the study is the approaches for secure
store and verify sensitive data on mobile devices.
5. Design
The main objective is to design a secure system than
can be certified and used on a state level [2], in order to
be trusted for both of sides: user side and government
side. To provide the highest level of security approach
that combining all security measures must be used
with purposed improvements for security enhancement.
Such system could be complicated in realization but
deployment and provisioning for the end-user shall be
simple and straightforward.
5.1. Approach details
Based on all the advantages and disadvantages of dif-
ferent approaches, approach that uses Rich Execution
Environment, Trusted Execution Environment and em-
bedded Secure Element was chosen this approach best
meets the security conditions. Purposed improvements
to this approach:
1) REE will only be used to send commands to the
eSE and TEE and for transmitting encrypted data,
no direct access to sensitive user data would be
provided for REE.
2) eSE will be used to store user credentials and
for all cryptographic calculations, such as encryp-
tion,decryption, verifying user data.
3) TEE will be used to display sensitive user data us-
ing Trusted User Interface (TUI) [11]. TUI allows
a Trusted Application to interact directly with the
user via a common display and touch screen, com-
pletely isolated from the REE [11], and no way to
copy, or still data from it.
5.2. mDL lifecycle
Lifecycle of the proposed approach on mobile device:
1) Execution of program starts with android applica-
tion in Rich Execution Environment, it is connected
with Trusted Execution Environment via TEE
Communicator or TA Connector (TLC). TLC fa-
cilitates communication between the application in
Rich OS (Android), and the corresponding Trusted
Application residing within TEE [3].
Since application in the REE can’t get access to
sensitive data stored in the eSE it shall send request
to TEE corresponding Trusted Application in order
Algorithms and methods of cyber attacks prevention and counteraction
47
to get ability to retrieve necessary data from the
eSE.
2) Corresponding Trusted Application in TEE re-
ceives request from Rich OS application, provides
additional security measures, forms request to eSE
and sends it via Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI).
SPI is a synchronous serial communication interface
in full duplex mode, designed to provide simple and
inexpensive high-speed pairing of micro-controllers
and peripherals primarily in embedded systems
[12].
3) In eSE special JavaCard application called Applet,
retrieves request from TEE and processes it. In
case if data shall be represented to the user inter-
face, sensitive data passed to the TEE, where it is
represented to screen via Trusted User Interface. In
case if sensitive data should be transferred, Applet
performs cryptographic calculations, forms special
secure structure ready for transferring and pass it
back to the TEE.
4) In case of data transfer TEE acts as intermediary
between eSE and REE which provides high level of
security and guarantees that sensitive data stored
in the eSE will remain untouched.
Fig. 2. mDL lifecycle on mobile device
5.3. Approach weaknesses
The proposed approach has the following weaknesses:
1) As it is proposed to use TEE, it will be necessary
to obtain the consent of the vendor, the keys for
the signing Trusted Application [8] to have ability
install it to the TEE.
2) The same issue with obtaining the consent from
the eSE vendor to be able to install the software
to the eSE.
However applets in eSE written on Java, this is not
quite ordinary Java, it is a special stripped-down
Java developed for JavaCard which has its own
API and a lot of things are cut from it, which will
also lead to an increase of development time and
cost of developing the necessary software for the
system.
3) Increases the complexity of development, respec-
tively, the cost and duration, in order to take into
account all the security measures in designing such
a system.
But from the other hand all the weaknesses of
the system and possible high cost of development
are leveled by the level of its security which can
provided by realization of all the above mentioned
technologies.
6. Deployment model
First of all, when it comes to a system that will func-
tion at the state level [2], the relevant laws governing
electronic credentials and identity identification should
be adopted.
The next step is to reach an agreement between
government and the device vendors in order to get keys
to have possibility installing the necessary software to
the eSE and TEE.
Following is to deploy the system itself. The main
element of this system is an Issuing authority. Its
primary task is to generate and sign credentials of the
user, secondary is to store all generated certificates and
act as server for data verification if needed.
Next, Credential Management System requests spec-
ified signed credentials from the Issuing authority of
a certain user and passes it to the Trusted Service
Manager.
Trusted Service Manager is a key element of the
system. Its stores all the necessary keys from eSE and
TEE to be able to provision the necessary data and
install required software.
The final element of this system is a mobile device of
end-user. The necessary software will be installed on
the device and signed credentials will be provisioned.
The proposed model is shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Deployment model of mDL system
Mobile driving license system deployment model with security enhancement
48
7. Conclusion
In this paper various approaches with different combi-
nation of technologies which provides security to storing
sensitive user data on a mobile device were analyzed
and identified advantages and disadvantages of these
approaches.
After analysis of different approaches based on pro-
vided level of security approach was selected for further
investigation on how to apply measures for security en-
hancement. Security enhancement measures were pur-
posed on the basis of this approach to increase provided
security level for the system.
Based on investigation of how to install all necessary
software to mobile device, the deployment model of
electronic driver’s license system is presented.
In the future, it is planned to develop a more efficient
deployment model of system that could reduce the cost
of resources for implementation
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